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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In Ootober of 1972, the Dissolution of Marriage Act 
(hereinafter referred to as the Act) beoame a part of the 
law and. judicial practice of the state of Oregon. The Act 
represents a.significant change in Oregon's law. It also 
represents a significant evolutionary development in the 
'attitude of the legal oommunity toward the process of 
divorce or. as it is now termed, dissolutian of marriage. 
I. THE PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The Aot was a response to extensive criticism from 
pr~fessionals and from the public. The problem is the legis­
lators ·were not sure of the effects of the Act. and now that 
it is in effect there is still little or no' objective data 
regarding its effectiveness. This study is an exploratory 
attempt to evaluate the consequences of the Aot, the accom­
plishment of ~ts stated purposes. and its impact upon the 
process of dissolution and the people involved. 
I hope to find if such legislation helps to mitigate 
the social cost of dissolution. I also hope to SUbstantiate 
the interrelatedness of some of the events within the process 
in order to stimulate further research whioh may be relevant 
to legislators, judges, attorneys, and mental health prac­
2 
titioners in their efforts to deal effectively with the 
breakup of families. 
II. THE CHANGE IN THE LAW 
Prior to the implementing of the Act in 1972, Oregon's 
divorce law was based on the adversary system. The courts 
awarded. a Decree of Divorce to one or both parties upon 
their presentation of proof of one or more of seven admis­
sable "grounds for divorce." The parties were protagonists 
and fault was to be determ~ned by the ~ourt. Collusion of 
parties was' illegal and was a basis for dismissal of the 
cpmplaint. The person filing for divorce was called the 
plaintiff and his or her spouse becam.e the d.efendant. 
Eyid.ence of conduct, of the parties :was admissable for any 
ot.the.decisions to be made by the court. I­
1 
! 
·Bateman, et ale (1970) provides a comprehensive review 
, 
of the history of divoroe. the adversary process, the grounds 
for divorce, and the status of divorce procedure in Oregon in 
1970. ,. ,As she notes. the practice of the courts was diiferent 
from the way the law was ~ctually written. The overwhelming 
majority of eases were initiated on the grounds of "cruel 
an4 inhuman treatment," and. roughly ninety per cent of the 
d~crees were granted in default. In default cases, the par-~ 
ties have ag~eed to the details of the settlement and the 
defendant does not usually appear at the final hearing. 
The Act attempts to abolish the concept of fault and 
the adversary process. Specific changes includea 
1. Abolishing rault-related ground.s It 
III' 
~ \'1 
I ,~,l 
I 
! -: 
! 
2. Admissability of evidence relating to': conduct. 
). Terminology. 
4. Residency requirements •. 
5. Encouraging collusion. 
Abolishing Fault-related Grounds 
Impotency, adultery. felony conviction, and the rest 
of the seven charges that were grounds for divorce under the 
former statute are all. abolished'by ~he Act. The sole issue 
replacing those is "Irreconcilable differences between the 
parties have cause.d the 'irremediable breakdown of the mar­
riage." The court now simplY'attempts to determine whether 
the marriage relationship is salvageable.. If the court 
agrees that the marriage breakdown is. indeed irremediable, 
a Decree of Dissolution of Marriage is issued.and the mar­
riage terminated without proof of guilt of the.parties 
becoming an issue. 
Admissability of Evidence Relating to Conduct 
Even though the granting of a Decree of Dissolution 
does not hinge upon the .establishment of fault, there is 
still one area in whioh evidence relating to cond.uct is 
admissable under the Act. When the custody of minor children 
is at issue. the court will accept evidence relating to the 
conduct of the parties provided that such evidence relates 
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either to the determination of the parent's suitability for 
custody or to the protection of the financial interests of 
the children. 
Terminology 
In addition to removing the potential antagonism of 
the fault-related grounds. the Act substitutes neutral words 
for maD1 of the terms used in the proceedings that cannata­
tive~y contribute to the feeling of combat between spouses. 
Some examples are the substitution of Petition for Complaint, 
Petitioner for Plai~tiff, Respondent for Defendant. and 
Dissolution of Marriage in place of the emotionally loaded 
word Divorce. 
Residency Reguirements 
The required period of time for residing in Oregon 
before legally filing for dissolution was reduced from one 
year to six months. The waiting period between the date of 
filing ~nd the issuance of the decree remains at the minimum 
of ninety days. Also unchanged is the sixty day wait pur­
suant to the decree before it becomes final. Dur,ing this 
time, the decree may be voided by joint consent of the 
parties 
Encouraging Collusion 
Under earlier law, oollusion was illegal. The Act 
not only legalizes it, but promotes it. The parties are 
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encouraged to a~ange their own settle~ents and. to plan for 
the interests of their children. Actually, this does not 
represent a very real change from the way the oourts treated 
this issue already. However. it does remove both. judges and. 
attorneys from the ethical. bind of having to almost contin­
ually ignore a desirable process that was still illegal. 
III. THE VALUE OF THIS STUDY 
The changes in the law presented here seem to me to be 
coherent, ,rational., and useful alterations. It is the task 
of the social scientist, however, to devise ways.to test the 
apparent worth of such steps and not to rely entirely upon 
the logical sound of them. Aocording to a statistician for 
the Fourth Judicial Distriot of the Circuit Court of Oregon, 
there were 5, 572 petitions for ,the... dissolution filed in 1972 
in Multnomah County. He reports that the number increases 
each year. The social costs of a problem affecting that 
many families each year must be evident to the pragmatist 
as well as the humanist. To the humanist, dissolution of 
marriage is an emotionally catastrophic event involving 
great personal loss to the individuals. It is accompanied 
by much conflict and involves extensive readjustment of the 
individ.uals' way of life. To the pragmatist, the financial 
burdens for part of that process are very real. Social 
institutions often bear all Dr part of the financial 
responsibility for children after a family breaks up_ 
·6 

The courts certainly take a concrete portion of the tax 
dollar. 
Ours is a family based culture •.. Any legislation. 
proposal, or program which aims at d.ealing with the breakup 
of families deserves the closest attention. We must check 
to see if what has been d.one has value. If it has none, 
it must be changed. If it has ~alue, it can be improved 
with the knowledge gained in the testing. The value of this 
study is ~n being a part of that process. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
I gained a fairly thorough familiarity with the 
general body of 1iterature on the subject of divorc.e while 
I worked as a consultant to the Domestic Court in Multnomah 
County from 1972 to' 1975. Much has been written about 
various aspects of divorce. Very little has been written 
on other aspects of the same topic. I felt certain that 
.. 
I would find adequate references reg~ding.~e cri~icisms 
of adversary domestic law and the trend of thinking that 
led to the Act. I was equally certain that I ~ould find 
very Iittle 'obj'ective information ab'out the effects of no­
faul ~. ,legislation. My survey verifi_~d those beliefs. 
I. ,.THE COMING OF NO-FAULT LEGISLATION 
In 1969. the National Conference of Commissioners 
on Uniform State Laws approved a model bill entitled the 
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act. This model bill proposed 
abolishing the adversary process in divorce and. substituting 
breakdown of marriage' for the traditional fault-related 
gr.oun4.s •. "By' the end of 1972, eight states had passed laws 
cQntaining that principie, several others had added break­
down of marriage to their existing grounds. and most of the 
other states were considering one form or another of 
8 
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similar legis~ation. 
Wheeler (1974), qu.oting the California Governor's Com­
mission on the Family, suggests a need for such legislation. 
In addition to simplifying the procedures and 
permitting the proper full inquiry by the court, 
the removal of the specific fault ground and the 
adoption of a 'breakdown of marriage' standard 
will eliminate much of the adversary aspect of 
divorce litigation by removing the need for spe­
cific accusation and answer. It will prevent the 
use of misconduct not formally alleged as a blud­
geon (by threat of its disclosure) in obtaining
extortion concessions.concerning support and the 
division of property from the oppos~ng spouse ­
concess'ions which are frequently inequitable and 
unworkable, and which do not represent any true 
agreement. Moreover, it will put an. end to the 
dissimulation, hypocrisy - and even outright per­
jury - which is engendered by the present system. 
Ron Gevurtz, a prominent Portland attorney in the 
practice of domestic law, described in a~personal interview 
how he saw Oregon's no-fault law as a legislative response 
to bombardment by humanists. According to Ge~rtz. propon-· 
ents of the Act used the reasons given in the above quote. 
Humphrey (1972) writes that rigid rules' for divorce 
serve "only to exacerbate underlying feelings of animosity 
and scorn." He and others also make very clear that divorce 
by consent is 'absolutely unacceptable. He sees the concept 
of "irretrievable breakdown~'v as a compromise between the 
adversary process and divorce by consent. 
Cline and Westman (1971) underline the need for change, 
pointing out how feelings of animosity are sometimes trans­
lated into assault. child abduction. and post-divorce murder. 
9 
Crowe and Harrington (1971), commenting on the purposes 
of the Act, write. 
The traditional concept of divorce based on'~au1t 
has been singled out as an ineffective barrier to 
marriage d.issolution. which .is regularly overcome 
by perjury and, thus promotes disrespect for the law 
and its processes. and as an unfortunate device 
which adds to the bitterness and hostility of divorce 
proceedings. 
I have quoted only a few sour~~~, but the same issues 
I recur throughout the literature. Legislators, attorneys, 
L 
I. and social scientists all seem to agree that trad~tionali 
: divoro'e -l~gisla~i~1't~:rostE:)r~~._ circ1llQ.venting of the law and. 
added to the hostilities between· par~ies to the divorce. 
Wheeler (1974), in his chapter on "The Po~itics of Reform," 
makes a comment that sums up the social atmosphere. 
Across the country there seems to be a sense that 
our divorce laws are outmoded and serve no useful 
purpose. Whether or not this proposition can be 
scientifically proven - public opinion polls on such 
issues as divorce are of d,ubious value - it does seem 
:- as if only a minor!ty of the population is stead.fastly
opposed t~ any revision of the laws.' People may not 
be sure of what must be done, but there is a general
feeling that reform is in order. 
II. AFTER NO-FAULT DIVORCE 
Howard. Krom (1970), Director of t~e 9alifornia 
: ' 
, ~epartment of Public Health Bureau ~f Vital Statistics, 
.-. 
points ~ut, • •••substantive information relative to divorce 
is cons-picuous. by its absence." 'fhis seems to be particu­
larly true with regard to statistically te~table data from 
stud.ies which examine faotors' within the process of divorce. 
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Lena Heritage (1972), in her dissertation, attempted 
~~ isolate factors and. their effect. on post-divorce ad­
justment. Unfortunately. she was relatively unsuccessful 
in her attempt to isolate significant variables. This 
suggest the difficulty of research in this area and may 
partially account for the paucity of written material that 
includes.h~lpful substantive information. 
Wheeler (1974) includes a few statistics in his book 
on no-fault divorce. He reports that the divorce rate rose 
46~ in 1970, the first year of Calif.o~ia~s reformed: law, 
d.ipped slightly the next year., and rose slightly again the 
year after that. Interestingly e~ough~ Oregon statistics 
showed no suoh dramatic increase.. The rate is climbing. but 
$he passage of the Act did not significantly affect1ths slow, 
steady increase in divorce 'statistics of the past few years. 
Wheeler (1974) reports certain other appare~t effects 
of the no-fault legislation in California. In 1970, the 
divorce rate in Nevada dropped 15%. Wheeler estimates a 
rise in the percentage of persons filing for divorce without 
the aid of an.attorney. Roughly 1% filed that way before, 
and the rate since 1970 has been about 5%. A direct rela­
tionship has not been established. but Wheeler thinks also 
that California judges have begun to lower the amounts they 
award for alimony and settlements since 1970. 
Goddard (1972) reports the effects similarly. He also 
reports an dncrease in the proportion of husbands filing for 
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divorce. Basing his study upon interviews with judges, 
Goddard also mentions that they seem to be relativeiy 
pleased. with the time-saving effect of the law. 
Zuckman and Fox (1972) describe many of the above 
elements as short term effects of ~he 1970 Califo~nia law. 
However, they add a very interesting possibility to the list. 
They, feel that the trad.itional law with i ts faul t-related 
grounds lent a therapeutic cathartic effect to the divorce 
proc~ss. Under the ne~ law, this cathartic effect has, they 
believe, been diminished. 
Judge Harlow Lenon of Multnomah County, discussed his 
impressions of the effects of the Oregon no-fault law in a 
personal int~rview. He believes that it has significantly 
reduced cpurt ti~e. He, like Zuckman and Fox, believes that 
no-fault has removed a therapeutic discharge.from the divorce 
process. ,He further states the inadmissability of evid.ence 
relating to conduct rule and the changing moral climate have 
comb~ned ~o increase the capacity for husbands to advance 
their cau~es in court. 
Judge J~an Lewis of Multnomah County, speaking in a 
personal interview, corroborated that last statement. She 
reports more property fights because men no longer have to 
buy ~heir freedom. She believes that most of these property 
fights require less time than previously, but the .. complicated 
cases actually take longer. 
Victoria Stevenson (1976), a third year law student at 
12 
the University of Oregon, has performed the only study of 
the results of the Act in Oregon to date. She obtained the 
bulk of her data through interviews with various domestic 
court judges. She reports increased litigation and attri­
butes it to the reduction of risk that the parties' past 
conduct will be exposed. She cites statistics from four 
counties from 1970 and 1973 which show a change from 4.2% 
to 6.5% in the percentage of cases which are contested. 
The benefits of no-fault have not materialized according 
to Stevenson. She believes catharsis is unavoidable and 
some judges are allowing the process to continu~ as before 
the nO-fault rule. She concludes that Oregon would be 
better. off if we returned to the fault system until. judges 
could d.elate their ingrained biases toward establishing 
fault from their handling of the dissolution process. 
CHAPTER III 
METHOD 
I wanted to evaluate the impact of the Act on people 
in the:- dissolution process. Accordingly. I drew samples of 
selected variables from time period~ before and after the 
implementation of the Act. I compared the samples of the 
time periods for differences in the variables. I then tested 
for the significance of those differences. 
I • THE SAMPLES 
I drew data from two 's~parate sources. The source of 
the main body of data was the legal files of divorce cases 
of the Fourth JUdicial District of the Circuit Court of 
Oregon, which provides services' to the resid.ents of Multnomah 
County. Secondarily, I used certain statistics from the 
~onc~liation files of the Department of Family Services, a 
public agency that provides conciliation services to the 
resiQents of ~ltnomah County and consultant services to 
the court. For those who wish to become more specifically 
familiar with the Family Services Agency, Brune. et ale 
(1970) provides a detailed description of the development 
and functions of the agency and its relationship to the 
court. 
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Sampling the Legal Files 
I chose to compare data from 1969 with data from 1972. 
I chose 1972 because I wished to check each case a full two 
years atter the decree was issued to record the number of 
cases which required returns to court. I chose 1969 to 
ensure that no cases of extraordinary longevity were decided 
under the no-fault rule.. Because the Act was implemented in 
the autumn of 1972, it was necessary to limit the 1972 sample 
to cases filed in-November or December. I applied this same 
limitation to the 1969 sample to, assure ,consistency. 
The court maintains lis'ts of each years' divorce case$ 
in large hardbound volumes. The volumes are divided alpha­
betioally into 99 approximately eq~al sections. The names., 
and numbers of the cases in each section are entered. by 
chronological order of filing. I assigned each section a 
number from 1 through 99. Using a table of random numbers. 
I selected 50 sections. I arbitrarily chose the last 6 
entries in each section from which to draw the case numbers. 
This ensured that the cases were from November and December 
of the sample years. I then threw a die 50 times to select 
the cases from the group of 6 in each section. This process 
left me with 3 duplications of cases. I resolved this by 
3 more tosses of the die. 
Defining the Variables 
The information I wanted was contained in the legal 
forms, documents " court orders • affidavits, motions f and 
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other papers that accrue in a divorce file as it goes 
through the court process. I drew a trial sample of 10 
cases, 5 from each year, to gain a clearer idea of the in­
formation which would be consistently avallable from this 
source. With this information I devised a simple data 
sheet for recording the variables I will discuss below. 
Petitioner. Under this heading I recorded the sex of 
the person filing for dissolution. 
Children. I recorded the number of children in this 
column. However, I was more interested in separating 
couples with no children from families including children. 
Ego Threats. I noted the presence or absence of ego­
threatening statements in each case. I defined ego-threats 
to be statements in papers filed to the court. of a specific 
accusatory na~ure. and relating to the. conduct of the spouse 
which, if accepted as true. would result in loss of self 
esteen by the spouse. Some examples are desertion, alco­
holism, child beating, ~ •• 
Type of Final Hearing. There are three types of final 
hearings at which the decree is granted. A default is a 
case in which there were no issues left unresolved at the 
time of the final hearing. Most often only the filing party 
is present at the hearing. Although legally different, a 
prima facie case is, for purposes of this study, similar to 
a default and was included in that category. A contest is a 
case which comes to court for the final hearing with issues 
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unresolved and to be decided by the court. In a dis~issal, 
the parties remain married, and the suit is withdrawn. These 
were noted also in'this section. 
Issues Contested. Of those cases contested" I noted 
whether the issues were children, property, or both. 
Multiple Hearings. I differentiated between cases 
with a single hearing and those with. multiple hearings. 
Time in Process. I recorded the length of time in 
months between the date of filing and the date of the final 
hearing. 
Returns to Court. I noted the cases which returned to 
court for fur~he~ litigation during the first two years 
following issuance of the decree. 
Conciliation Statistics 
The'second data source was a statistical record kept 
by the Department of Family Services. I recorded the total 
popula~ionf for 1970 and 1973, of cases in which a Petition 
f?r Reconcil-iation... a formal application for marriage coun­
seling, was filed, and where a Petition for Dissolution,was 
already filed with the court. I then recorded the numb~r of 
cases marked RE (reconciliation effected), RR (reconcil;ation 
rejected). and as (outcome unknown). This provided the pro­
portions of those couples electing to remain married and those 
electing to terminate their marriages. These figures reflect 
the attitudes of the couples at the time of their last 
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contact with the agency. They do not represent exactly the 
ultimate decisions they might make. 
II. THE ~POTHESIS 
Underlying Assumption 
I make the following underlying assumption in the 
formulation of my hypothesisl If tne implementation of the 
Act significantly removes negative impact upon the emotional 
dynamics of families in the divorce process, that change 
will be reflected in the statistics of the court-related 
behaviors of such families. 
Central Hypothesis 
'. The centrai hypothesis stated in null terms is I 'The 
Act had no significant impact-on families going through the 
divorce process. 
Sub-hypotheses 
The sub-hypotheses are the comparisons of data from 
the two years for each of the variables described in the last 
chapter section. To avoid redundancy and ensure clarity, 
they will be stated along with the results in the following 
chapter. 
III. ANALYSIS OF THE DATA 
t 
The variables are represented by numerical data. I 
arranged the data in tabular form and observed each variable 
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for differences between the two years. Where appropriate, 
I tested. the differences f.or significance using such tests 
as Chi Square and the Significance of the Difference Between 
Two Proportions. I elected to use the .05 level of oonfi­
dence in the tests, since this is an exploratory study, and 
I do not wish to· accept the null hypothesis prematurely. 
CHAPTER IV 
FINDINGS 
I. THE CONCILIATION SAMPLE 
Many couples seek marital counseling after one of the 
parties has filed for dissolution. The Act purports to 
remove the negative effect of traditional law upon families 
already in trouble. Therefore, I developed the hypothesis 
that of those couples who seek counseling while a suit for 
I dissoluti.on is pending, a greater proportion will reconcile 
"I after filing under the Act than reconciled after filingI 
1 
under traditional law. Observation of 'Table I shows that, 
no such increase occurred, and the hypothesis is not 
accepted. I tested, the observed decrease with the test o~ 
Significance of the Difference Between Proportions. .X u~ed . 
the .05 level of confidence. The ~ score computed at .76, 
indicating that the difference is not significant. 
TABLE I 
DISTRIBUTION OF OUTCOMES. COMPARING 1970 AND 1973 

COUPLES SEEKING MARRIAGE COUNSELING 

,AT FAMILY SERVICES AGENCY, 

DISSOLUTION FILED . 
1970 1973 
Reconciliation Effected 50 30 
Reconciliation Rejected 173 122 
Outcome Unknown 130 79 
Total 353 
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,II. ANALYSIS OF THE LEGAL FILES SAIVlPLE 
Observation of Table II a,hows the results of the 1969 
sample compare very similarly with the 1972 sample. Upon 
preliminary comparison, the samples do not reveal enough 
differences to support a hypothesis that the Act signifi­
cantly altered the impact of the process of dissolution of 
marriage on families. However, before accepting such a 
conclusion, each variable merits analysis and discussion• 
. TABLE II 
DATA COMPARISON FROM THE 1969 AND 1972 SAMPLES 
OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
CIRCUIT COURT OF OREGON' 
DISSOLUTION FILES 
1969 1972 
1. 	 Petitioner 
Husbands 
Wives 
2. 	 Minor Children 
Yes 
No 
3· Ego Threats, 
Yes 
No 
4-. Type of Final Hearing
Default 
Contest· 
Dismissal 
Jurisdictional Transfer 
Issues 	Contested 
Child Custody
Property
Both Custody and Property
6. 	 Hearings
Single
MU'ltiple
7. Mean Time in Process (months)
8. 	 Returns to Court 
Yes 
No 
14 15 
36 35 
31 	 27 
19 	 23 
14 11 
36 39 
34 35 
7 8 
8 	 7 
1 0 
2 2 
4 	 3
1 	 3 
28 33 
13 to 
4.86 5·72 
8 7 
33 36 
21 
Petitioner 
I hypothesized that the removal of the necessity to 
prove fault might give rise to an increase in the proportion 
of husbands filing for dissolution. Observation of the 
first variable of Table II shows an increase of only lout -_ 
of 50, clearly not a significant difference. It is also of 
interest to note that no couples in.the 1972 sample took 
advantage of the Act's new provision for co-petitioning for 
dissolution of marriage. 
Child.ren 
Because the data showed an increase in the proportion 
of childless couples, I hypothesized that the decision to 
obtain a dissolution was easier to make for couples without 
children under the Act than before. I tested this by means 
of phi Square. The Chi Square of the sample computed at 
flJ-? 
r 
Chi Square at the .05 level with 1 degree of freedom 
is 3.84, indicating rejection of the hypothesis (Table~III). 
TABLE III 
CHI SQUARE, RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PRESENCE 
OR ABSENCE OF CHILDREN AND THE 
CHANGE IN THE LAW 
1262 12Z2 Total 
Couples with Children 31 27 58 
Couples with No Children 19 23 42 
Total 50 50 100 
2X2 sample = .3? x .05, 1 df = 3.84 
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Ego Threats 
The data show a small decrease in the number of cases 
filed under the Act which contain ego threatening statements. 
Since one of the major changes in the law pertained to the 
retnoval. of adversary wording, I--hypothesized that the 
decrease in' such cases is related to the implementation of 
the Act. I computed Chi Square to test this hypothesis. 
The computed Chi Square of the sample was .21. Chi Square 
at,the .05 level with l' degree of freedom is 3.84, indi­
cating that the difference in the s~ples occurred by chance, 
thus rejecting the hypothesis-(Table IV). 
TABLE IV 
CHI SQUAREa RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE 

PROPORTION OF EGO THREATS AND 

THE CHANGE IN THE LAW 

1269 12Z2 Total 
Ego Threats in the File 14 11 25 
No Ego Threats,·' in the File 36 39 75 
Total 50 50 100 
X2 :sample = .21 X2 .05, 1 df = 3·84 
Type of Hearing 
Observation (referring back to Table II) shows that 
the number of defaults, contests, and dismissals remained 
v~ry nearly the same across the two samples. The differences 
will not support any but a null hypothes.is. The difference 
between this result and the Stevenson (1976) study, which 
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shows an increase in the percentage of contested cases, can 
be explained. Her sample is actually the total population 
of dissolution cases for four counties. A' sample of that -~ 
size will lend significance to a small change. 
Issues Contested 
The sample of contested cases, 7 for 1969 and 8 for 
1972, is not large enough to permit analysis of the issues 
of the contests. It is interesting to note that no cases in 
1969 were contested with the divorce being the sale issue. 
Hearings 
The s~ples show a. decrease in the number of cases 
,requiring multiple hearings in 1972. I hypothesized that 
a relationship exists between the implementation of the Act 
and the need for less hearings. I tested for the signi­
ficance of this by means of Chi Square (Table V). For this 
TABLE 'v 
CHI SQUARE, RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PROPORTION 

OF CASES REQUIRING MULTIPLE HEARINGS 

AND THE CHANGE IN THE LAW 

" 
1262 12Z2 Total 
Single Hearing Cases 13 10 23 
Multiple .Hearing Cases 28 33 61 
Total 41 43 84 
2X2 sample = .39 x .05, 1 df = 3·84 

test I omitted the cases which were dismissed and the 1 case 
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transferred. Chi Square of the sample was computed at -39. 
Chi Square at, the .05 level with 1 degree of freedom is 
3.84. thereby refu·ting the hypothesis that the Act signi­
ficantly reduced the incidence of cases requiring multiple 
hearings. 
IMe~ Time in Proc~ss 
The 1972 sample showed a mean increase in the time in 
process of .86 months per completed case. I am not sure 
which of several factors. the rising dissolution rate, the 
increasing percentage of contests, changes in court per­
sonnel, or some other unexplained effect of the Act, might 
account for the increase. Using the data in Table VI, 
I 
I 
I tested the hypothesis that the increase is significant.i.' 
TABLE VI 
COMPARISON OF THE MEAN, STANDARD DEVIATION, 

AND SAMPLE SIZE OF MONTHS IN PROCESS 

OF 1969 AND 1972 DISSOLUTION CASES 

Months in Process 1262 12Z2 
Mean 4.86 5.72 
Standard Deviation 2.81 3.10 
Sample Size 41 43 
I used the test for the Significance of the Difference 
Between Sample Means. The sample sizes yield 82 degrees of 
freedom, allowing use of the normal curve. A ~ score of 
1.645 or higher would be significa~t in a one-tailed test 
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at the .05 confidence level. The computed ~ score of the 
test was 1.327. Therefore, the· hypothesis that the increase 
is significant is rejected. 
Returns to Court 
Before I examined the data, I formed the hypothesis 
that the Act, by promoting collusion and by dilution of the 
adversary process, would reduce the 'proportion of cases that 
return to court for further litigation after the decree has 
been issued. However, observation of the samples indicates 
the number of returns to court diminished by only 1 case in 
the 1972 sample compared to the 1969 sample. A difference 
of 1 will not support a hypothesis that. a relationship exists 
between the change in law and cases returning to court. 
III. OTHER FACTORS WITH RETURNS TO COURT 
Cases which return to court after issuance of the 
d.ecree represent failure of the court process to bring 
resolution to relationships in crisis. I hav~ formulated the 
hypothesis, not fully testable by this study, that there 
exists a sizable number of identifiable factors which have 
a testable relationship with cases that return to court. If 
extended research can. isolate ·enough such factors, it may be 
possible to identify couples with a high risk for returning 
to court, and. further, to reduce that risk. 
Not to draw conclusions, but to stimulate research, I 
have tested for relationships between returns to court and 
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some of the other variables isolated in this study. Since I 
had already tested each of the eight variables and found no 
signifioant differenoes, I deoided it would be valid, as an 
exploratory method. to treat the 1969 and 1972 samples as one 
larger sample.. I tested for these relationships by meanS of 
Chi Square._ I noticed while computing Chi Squares that the 
distribution of cases (15 cases returned to court, 84 did 
not return) sometimes left.a theoretical frequency of less 
than 5 cases. This causes the computed Chi Square to lack 
validity. I will present·the computed values anyway, since 
I am only attempting to stimulate research. 
I first tested to see if there was a relationship 
between the sex of the petitioner and cases returning to 
court. Observation of the data indicated that the number 
of petitioner-husbands and petitioner-~ives was spread pro­
portionately across the cases returning to court. This 
indicated that there was no significant relationship. 
I observed that 80% of those cases which returned to 
court were families with children. This led me to hypo­
thesize that the presence of minor children would increase 
the likelihood of cases returning to court. The computed 
Chi Square of the sample was 2.64. Chi Square at the .05 
level with 1 degree of freedom is J.84~(Table VII). Although 
this result'indicates that the above hypothesis is rejected, 
I observed while reading the legal files that most of the 
returns to court were to settle disputes over custody or 
! 
~ , 
visitation. 
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TABLE VII 
CHI SQUARE. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PRESENCE 
OF CHILDREN AND RETURNS TO COURT 
Returns No Returns Total 
Couples with Children 12 45 57 
Couples with No Children 3 39 42 
Total 15 84 99 
X2 sample == 2.64 X,2 .05, 1 df == 3·84 
It'seemed very probable that a strong relationship 
would exist between ego threats and returns to court. I 
computed the Chi Square of this sample at 9.24. Chi Square 
at the, .05 level with 1 degree of freedom is 3.84. Therefore, 
the test indicates that a significant relationship does exist 
between these two variables (Table VIII). 
TABLE VIII 
CHI SQUARE. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 

EGO THREATS AND RETURNS 

TO COURT 

Returns No Returns Total 
Ego Threats 9 16 25 
No Ego Threats 6 68 74 
Total 15 84 99 
X2 sample == 9.24 X2 .05, 1 df == 3.84 
Reasoning along the same line, I felt sure that cases 
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which were contested at the time of dissolution were of sig­
nificantly greater likelihood to return to court. However, 
the computed Chi Square of the sample was only 1.84, indi­
cating th&t the apparent relationship between contested 
cases and returns to court is not statistically sigini­
ficant. Chi Square at the .05 level with 1 degree of 
freedom is equal to 3.84 (Table IX) •. 
TABLE IX 
CHI SQUARE, RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONTESTS 
AND RETURNS TO COURT 
Returns No Returns Total 
Contests 5 10 15 
Defaults 10 59 69 
Total 15 69 84 
X2 sample =1.84 X2 .05. 1 df = 3.84 
I tested the last variable, cases with multiple ver­
sus single hearings, to see if there was a relationship 
between multiple hearing cases and returns to court. The 
computed Chi Square of this sample was 15.93. Since Chi 
Square at the .05 level with 1 degree of freedom is equal to 
3.84, the hypothesis that a significantly high percentage of 
cases which require multiple hearings during the dissolution 
process also require further litigation is accepted (See 
Table X). 
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TABLE X 
CHI SQUARE. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
MULTIPLE HEARINGS AND 
RETURNS TO COURT 
Returns No Returns Total 
Multiple Hearing Cases 10 13 23 
Single Hearing Cases 5 71 76 
Total 15 84 99 
X2 sample = 15.93 X2 .05, 1 df = 3.84 
CHAPTER V 
LIMITATIONS, CONCLUSIONS, AND SUGGESTIONS 
FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
I. LIMITATIONS 
The principle limitation of this study, and a source 
of frustration for myself, is that it includes no data from 
the members of families going through the painful process 
that the study purports to deal with. It is not that there 
is no value to the study of factors isolated from within the 
legal files. It is rather that any .thorough study of this 
same topic must include data from both sources. 
I believe this study 'is further limited in the fol­
lowing ways. 
1. ,The assumption underlying the central hypothesis 
may not be correct.• · It is possible that the change in the 
law has had value for people in ways other than court-related 
behaviors •. 
2. The size of the samples was small enough to partly 
affect the validity of the study and to limit its analysis. 
J. The time segments that were compare~ were short. 
4. The sample of cases .filed under the Act was drawn 
from a time period too soon after the implementation of the 
Act. Measurable benefits of the Act may appear after judges, 
attorneys, and the public have had. time to adjust their 
attitudes to the spirit of the new law. 
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II. CONCLUSIONS 
~iven the limitations of this study, I cannot draw 
powerful conclusions about the value of the Act. Certainly, 
-. 
this exploratory study do~s not provide hint of cradit,:, for 
the Ac't excepting that it has brought the law more closely 
into line, with procedure. As a humanistic -weapon out to 
deal the adversary feel to the dissolution process a great 
blow, the Act is a failure. Certainly, insofar as the body 
qf data represents reality, the central hypothesis stated 
in null terms is accepte~. The Act seems to have made no 
measureable impact up9n families in the process of disso­
lution. 
That phenomenon may be explained by the old difficulty 
of trying ,to legislate effectively in an area where people's 
values- "and emotions tend to rule their behaviors. It also 
may be explained because people who d.ecide to terminate their 
marriages are culturally defined as failures in one sense. 
Add to that the very real loss.~ of their previous support 
system, however "bad" it may have been, and, it is no wonder 
that they bring 
.' 
to ~ourt an ultra-competitive attitude that 
feeds .. and feeds on the adversary process. In other words, 
L~ seems much to ask of the Act that it remove the compe­
titive component from the dissolution process, when the rest 
of the,culture demands competitive performance. 
Specifically. I conclude that the greatest value of 
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this study will be if those who read it decide that we need 
to learn much more, and perhaps make radical changes in our 
thinking, about' ways in which the ad.versary system may be 
removed from the process of dissolution of marriage. 
III. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The limitations of this study.are, in themselves, 
I 
implication for further research with similar objectives. 
I Although obviously requiring considerable time and effort, 
I a study including interviews and follow-ups over time of 
I 
I 
i families in process of dissolution would produce a qualityi 
of data not currently available. 
. In the latter part of the previous chapter, I d.emon­
strated that significant relationships seem to ex~st between 
cases requiring returns to court and. two oth~r factors. That 
is only a beginning. Given an expanded data source with 
many factors to work with, social reseacher's may be able to 
isolate the kind of decisions that will have the desired 
impact upon the process. 
I The criticism of traditional adversary divorce 
sounded meaningful and compelling. The Act was a direct 
response to those and yet it seems not to be the ~nswer. 
We must now generate an answer with objective data, not 
guess again. 
~-------------------------------------------------------------/ 
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